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Buy Skype Credit. But it is, nonetheless, really interesting if something as fundamental as communication provides such a reason. I put this as an issue about communication. Maybe the literature on repeated games might help in some way. There are empirical indications that various skills and maybe even virtues are pretty domain specific.

It seems that being good at reasoning about one thing need not make one good at reasoning about another, even if the reasoning is formally equivalent. I do have a piece of anecdotal data, though. Nothing nearly like a marathon, but things like swimming km, or climbing for an hour, typically but not always competing against myself.

And I have noticed some transfer of skills and maybe even of the virtue of patience both between the various sports and between the sports and other repetitive activities, such as grading. For instance, I can compare how tired I feel half-way through a long set of climbs and how tired I feel half-way through a 2 km swim, and the comparison can give me some strength. Pacing is also much less important for grading. One might think that reasons for action are exhaustively and exclusively divided into the moral and the prudential.

Here is a problem with this. Suppose that you have a spinner divided into red and green areas. If you spin it and it lands into red, something nice happens to you; if it lands on green, something nice happens to a deserving stranger.

You clearly have reason to spin the spinner. But, assuming the division of reasons, your reason for spinning it is neither moral nor prudential. So what should we say? One possibility is to say that there are only reasons of one type, say the moral. I find that attractive.

Then benefits to yourself also give you moral reason to act, and so you simply have a moral reason to spin the spinner.

So you have two reasons, one moral and one prudential. Response: That may be right in the simple case. Now the reason-giving strength of a chancy outcome is proportionate to the probability. But in the saturated nonmeasurable case, there is no probability, and hence no meaningful strength for the red-based reason or for the green-based reason. But there is a meaningful strength for the red-or-green moral-cum-prudential reason.

The red-or-green-based reason hence does not reduce to two separate reasons, one moral and one prudential. Now, one might have technical worries about saturated nonmeasurable sets figuring in decisions. But now instead of supposing saturated nonmeasurable sets, suppose a case where an agent subjectively has literally no idea whether some event E will happen—has no probability assignment for E whatsoever, not even a ranged one except for the full range from 0 to 1. And now suppose that the agent is told that if they so opt, then they will get something nice on E and a deserving stranger will get something nice otherwise.

I think it is sometimes said that it is anachronistic to attribute to the ancient Greeks the discovery that the square root of two is irrational, because what they discovered was a properly geometrical fact, that the side and diagonal of a square are incommensurable, rather than a fact about real numbers.

It is correct to say that the Greeks discovered an incommensurability fact. But it is, I think, worth noting that this incommensurability fact is not really geometric fact: it is a geometric-cum-arithmetical fact.

Here is why. The claim that two line segments are commensurable says that there are positive integers m and n such that m copies of the first segment have the same length as n copies of the second.

This claim is essentially arithmetical in that it quantifies over positive integers. And because pure Tarskian geometry is decidable, while the theory of the positive integers is not decidable, the positive integers are not definable in terms of pure geometry, so we cannot eliminate the quantification over positive integers.

In fact, it is known that the rational numbers are not definable in terms of pure geometry either, so neither the incommensurability formulation nor theory irrationality formulation is a purely geometric claim. I think the answer is positive, as long as one has a moderate pacifism that is opposed to lethal violence but not to all violence.

I think that a prohibition of all violence is untenable. It seems obvious that if you see someone about to shoot an innocent person, and you can give the shooter a shove to make them miss, you presumptively should. Some of these might violate current international law, but it seems that a pacifist country could modify its commitment to some accords. After all, tasers sometimes kill, too. They do so less than 0. Third, we might subdivide moderate pacifists based on whether they prohibit all violence that foreseeably leads to death or just violence that intentionally leads to death.

If it is only intentionally lethal violence that is forbidden, then quite a bit of modern warfare can stand. If the enemy is attacking with tanks or planes, one can intentionally destroy the tank or plane as a weapon, while only foreseeing, without intending, the death of the crew. Can one drop a bomb on an infantry unit intending to smash up their rifles without intending to kill the soldiers?

Similarly, one can bomb enemy weapons factories. Whether such a limited way of waging war could be successful probably depends on the case. Imagine a moderate pacifist who rejects lethal self-defense, but allows non-lethal self-defense when appropriate, say by use of tasers. Now, imagine that one person is attacking you and nine other innocents, with the intent of killing the ten of you, and you can stop them with a taser.

Surely you should, and surely the moderate pacifist will say that this is an appropriate use case for the taser. Very well. Now consider this on a national level. Suppose there are a million enemy soldiers ordered to commit genocide against ten million, and you have two ways to stop them:.

But tasers occasionally kill people. Then option 1 results in enemy deaths. So maybe our choice is between tasing a million, thereby non-intentionally killing soldiers, and intentionally killing one general. It seems to me that 2 is morally preferable, even though our moderate pacifist has to allow 1 and forbid 2. Note that a version of this argument goes through even if the moderate pacifist backs up and says that tasers are too lethal.

For suppose instead of tasers we have drones that destroy the dominant hand of an enemy soldier while guaranteeing survival with science fictional medical technology. But now compare:. I think 4 is still morally preferable to causing the kind of disruption to the lives of a million people that plan 3 would involve.

These may seem to be consequentialist arguments. I don't think so. I don't have the same intuitions if we replace the general by the general's innocent child in 2 and 4 , even if killing the child were to stop the war e. A normative power is a power to change a normative condition.

Here is a picture on which this is correct. We exercise a normative power by exercising a natural power in such a context that the successful exercise of the natural power is partly constitutive of a normative fact. For instance, we utter a promise, thereby exercising a natural power to engage in a certain kind of speech act, and our exercise of that speech act is partly constitutive of, rather than causal of, the state of affairs of our being obligated to carry out the promised action.

There are two versions of the above model. On one version, there is an underlying fundamental conditional normative fact C , such as that if I have promised something then I should do it, and my exercise of normative power supplies the antecedent A of that conditional, and then the normative consequent of C comes to be grounded in C and A.

On another version, there there are some natural acts that are directly constitutive of a normative state of affairs, not merely by supplying the antecedent of a conditional normative fact. I think the first version of the model is the more plausible in paradigmatic cases. But why not allow for a causal model? Why not suppose that a normative power is a causal power to make an irreducible normative property come to be instantiated in someone?

Thus, my power to promise is the power to cause myself to be obligated to do what I have promised. I think the difficulty with a causal model is the fact that in paradigm cases of normative power, there is a natural power that is being exercised, and we have the intuition that the exercise of the natural power is necessary and sufficient for the normative effect.

Maybe the answer to both questions is that I could, but only metaphysically and not causally. In other words, it could be that the laws of nature, or of human nature, make it impossible for me to exercise one of the powers without the other, just as I cannot wiggle my ring finger without wiggling my middle finger as well.

On this view, if there is a God, he could cause me to acquire promissory-type obligations without my promising, and he could let me engage in the natural act of promising while blocking the exercise of normative power and leaving me normatively unbound.

Perhaps the real problem for a lot of people with a causal view of normative powers is that it tends to lead to a violation of supervenience. But supervenience does not seem to me to be inescapable. Saturday, December 17, The right can be derived from the good. There is a way to connect the right and wrong with the good and bad: An action is right respectively, wrong if and only if it is noninstrumentally good respectively, bad to do it.

Labels: bad , good , Natural Law , right , wrong. Variation in priors and community epistemic goods. Here is a hypothesis: It is epistemically better for the human community if human beings do not all have the same ur- priors.

But does epistemic rationality care about what is good for the community? Labels: Bayesianism , Natural Law , permissivism , priors , rationality. Friday, December 16, Panteleology: A few preliminary notes. Panteleology holds that teleology is ubiquitous. Every substance aims at some end. You can't have a negative balance in our program. Your revenue is made up entirely of profits.

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At the same time, the harmony need not be perfect. Thus we have an argument that at least some subjective utilitarians will have to become convention-bound, either by getting themselves to believe that convention has normative force or by being akratic. It seems to me that 2 is morally preferable, even though our moderate pacifist has to allow 1 and forbid 2. The above is all shared knowledge for Alice and Bob. 原创 如何安装MockingBird-AI拟声: 5秒内克隆您的声音并生成任意语音内容 作者：虚坏叔叔早餐店不会开到晚上，想吃的人早就来了！😄。 原创 Js逆向教程跟值技巧 一般不会出现在jquery成熟的第3仓库里面。jquery是封装好的成熟的第3仓库，一般不会去修改它。因为如果jquery版本提升了，还要去改jquery。

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